

2018 XSB JANUARY STORMS CA-RTF-4 DEPLOYMENT AAR



BY: CAPTAIN ROBERT SEPULVEDA, JR. RTF-4 COORDINATOR







- Restrooms
- Water
- Electronic devices (silent)
- Portable Radios (off/low)
- Introductions



SCENARIO SUMMARY



 On January 9, 2018 at approximately 0315 hours, a heavy storm cell entered the Thomas Fire burn area of Santa Barbara, Montecito, and Carpinteria resulting in a catastrophic mudslide/debris flow. The slide created 3 main rivers of mud in the Cold Spring, San Ysidro, and Romero Creeks that destroyed hundreds of structures, wiped out the utility infrastructure, multiple blocked roads including US HWY 101 and resulted in 23 deaths.



CA US&R HISTORY



La Conchita Mudslide: January 2005






CA US&R HISTORY



Montecito Mudslide: January 2018





RTF-4 MOBILIZATION EXERCISE



On January 10, 2018, RTF-4 was participating in a mobilization exercise in Castaic from 1000-2200 hours.

RTF-4 was actively engaged in heavy breaking and breaching operations when the team was pre-alerted by Verdugo Fire Communications.





VERDUGO FIRE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER



On January 10th, at 1623 hours, OES notified Region 1 and requested CA-RTF-4 to the incident.

VFCC was notified at 1734 hours by Region 1.

RTF-4 was dispatched at 1744 hours from Del Valle Training Center to Santa Barbara.





VERDUGO FIRE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER



Page 1 of 1 Run Date: 1/10/2018 19:36/CST

RESOURCE ORDER				D	Initial ate/Time	2. Incident / Project Name						CA-MTO-000071					Financial Codes MMA - MASTER MUTUAL AID [P] CDAA			
OVERHEAD 01/07/18 1900 2018							XSB JANUARY STORMS					4. Office Reference Number					9. Jurisdiction / Agency Montecito Fire Protection Department			
Descriptive Location Hwy 101 to Las Positas Road. North to intersection of Las Positas and Calle Real (thontage road). Address: 3400 Calle Real, Santa Barbara, CA 93105 LAT. 34.2: LAT. 34.2:							27V		EC 17	Base MD San Bernare CA	dino, 58 i 580	8. Incident Base / Phone Number 58 EXPANDED 805-681-5504 58C Expanded 805-681-5504 CA-XSBC (Dispatch) 805-692-5735			fficer		10. Ordering Office Santa Barbara County Operational Area Coordination			
	Information					LONG. 119					CA-	-XSBC	(Dispatch) 805	5-692-5723 Dispato	h					
Bearing	Distance	VOR		Cor	ntact Name	Т	Frequency Type Assig				ssigned Fr	requen	cy	Reload Base	Other Aircraft / Hazards					
148	5	RZS	VFIRE 26				Tactical				154.3025 156.70			SBA						
95	19	GVO			VFIRE 24		Tactical				154.2725 156.70			SMX						
279	34	CMA	VFIRE 23				Tactical				154.2950 156.70									
					VFIRE 22			Tactical			154.2650	156.70	•							
								154.9950 TX SBC Com-2 127.30												
	-			MTO Tac-3 Victor				Command Tactical Air to Air				153.9050 RX SBC Com-2 110.90								
												153.8300 123.00 122.9								
					VFIRE 25		Tactical				154.2875 156.70									
				_	Calcord			Tactical			156.07	750								
12. Request Number	Ordered Date/Time	From	То	QΦ	Resource	Requested	Needed Date/Time	Deliver To	From Un	it To Unit	Assign Date/Ti		Resource Assigned Unit ID	Resource Assigned	Ind	Time Of Departure	Time O Arrival	f Date	d Released To	
	01/10/18 1623 PST	SBC Expanded 805 681 5504	CA-XSBC		Urban Sear Rescue Tea		01/10/18 2000 PST	Earl Warren Showground: (Santa Barbara,CA)	CA-XLCC	CA-XSBC	01/10/18 1734 PST		CA-XLCC	USAR RTF-4 Regional Task Force 4 (CA- XLCC)	м	01/10/18 1735 PST	01/10/18 1935 PST			
Travel Mode Financial Code CDAA						Special Needs Per OES Chief Messer: If CDAA Approved us For 30-man Region Task Force.				ing CF	AA methods.	Reporting Instruct	tions							
	cumentation	1																		
Req. No.		Documentation Entered By																		
0-113	Request O-113 - Urban Search and Rescue Team, Type 1 - [CA-MTO-000071] 2018 XSB JANUARY STORMS has been filled with USAR RTF-4 Regional Task Force 4 (CA-XLCC) by Melissa Leary@CA-XLCC ROSS.										'	Melissa Leary (CA-XLCC) 01/10/2018 1734 PST								

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2018 XSB JANUARY STORMS CA-MTO-000071

Run Date: 1/10/2018

19:36 CST



VERDUGO FIRE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER



Strengths:

- Pre-alerted Area "C" when request came from Region 1.
- Dispatched RTF-4 within 10 minutes from the request.
- -VFCC was evaluated on dispatching RTF-4 for Mobex 7 hours earlier.
- -RTF-4 text group was utilized with all info needed (no MDC).

Areas for improvement/recommendations:

- When filling out ROSS order, ensure that there are 30 technical specialist and the RTF-4 dispatch footprint.
- Continue to participate in quarterly RTF-4 drills and include ROSS order for drills.
- Utilize RTF-4 daily roster for ROSS/personnel info (TFL/ATFL)
- Travel route was never addressed with roads/fwy closed.



CA US&R REGIONAL TASK FORCES DEPLOYED



- CA RTF 1: Marin County/XMR
- CA RTF 2: Downey/XLE
- CA RTF 3: Long Beach/XLF
- CA RTF 4: Pasadena /XLC
- CA RTF 5: Fresno/FRN
- CA RTF 6: San Bernardino County/ XSB
- CA RTF 7: Ventura County/City/OXD
- CA RTF 8: LA County/ XLB
- -CA RTF 9: LA City/ XLA
- CA RTF 10: Orange County/XOR
- CA RTF 11: Bakersfield /BKF UTF
- CA RTF 12: Santa Barbara County/XSB



RTF-4 DEPLOYMENT



Strengths:

- -Team was together at one location when dispatched (Castaic).
- -Team was already rostered with VFCC.
- -Team has deployment drills four times a year.
- -Team was warmed up from Mobex.
- -Team was well prepared and selfsufficient for 72 hours.
- -Team assignments were made at Del Valle.
- -Structural Specialist





RTF-4 DEPLOYMENT



- Area for improvement/recommendations:
- -Had to find a BC with STEN qualifications.
- -Encourage BC's to take US&R Regional Task Force Leader.
- -Encourage all 7 agency BC's to attend RTF-4 quarterly drills.
- US&R 32 didn't have sleeping bags/cots.
- US&R 32 had to a crew swap (internal staffing needs) which delayed enroute time.
- -Entire footprint had to stop and get fuel in Santa Paula (1hr).







On January 11, 2018 RTF-4 was assigned to "Carpinteria Branch" for large area search in Toro Canyon.

Strengths:

- -BoO was set up in a great location.
- -All 5 all terrain vehicles (ATV's) were used for search.
- -Four search teams were deployed.
- -Search Manager kept one TSS for documentation.







Strengths:

- -Search Teams used GPS correctly.
- -Primary and secondary search was completed in the entire geographical area.
- -RTF-4 presented a search report to Division Supervisor with all of our findings with maps and GPS.
- -Structural Specialist assessed damaged structures.

Area for improvement/recommendations:

-Decon plan for team.










On January 12, 2018 RTF-4 was assigned to East Branch, South Division for large area search in Montecito for the next 5 days.

Strengths:

- -BoO was set up at a school parking lot shared with RTF-8.
- -Team briefings were conducted every day with objectives.
- -Seven search teams were deployed.
- -Heavy equipment was acquired.







Strengths:

- -Search report were given to Division Supervisor.
- -K9's were used from RTF-9.

Area for improvement/recommendations:

-Report findings to base camp with sit/stat unit.

Request heavy equipment if needed.

-Look into K-9 search team for RTF-4.









On January 15, 2018 RTF-4 was tasked with primary/secondary search (extrication) of heavily damaged vehicles.

RTF-4 searched and located 38 vehicles with 6 vehicles extracted and extricated using an excavator from Cal Trans.

4	WP / G75	NOTES / TIME	PLATE VIN"	F		/ GPS	NOTES / TIME	PLA
1	4-1 14613	VAN MHITE	CA - 7041438	27	37.0	69228	GREY MERCEDES	TMPA
-	001 - 115 KU 54 154 4-3	Silver Tayota Camry	P-78 & P125	v	-7	59225	MATTE TESLA SYSELIDPED FP24045	
3	002 - 115KUS4164 4-3 13846	Blue Grey BMW Wagan	P-GPMZ199	29	640	13644	MHLE BWA	UKCC 93
4	003 - 115KU59152 4-3 13851	Green Ford Branco	20K/B711	30	uif .	13652	Black BMM	7AL 2
5	4-3 13846	Grey Andi G.S	P75L1715	151	012	13734	TOYOTA 4 RUNNER	
b	005 - 115KU59137 4-3 13811	Silver BMW 325	PSUITO63	32	10- KT 2	57139 14134	GLERY MERCEDES	84976
7	4-3 13811	white Nerceles SUV	P-Dinas W566	33		. //	VINTAGE GREEN	WDDPK4
8	007-115KU59113	White BMW Sedan	PERMORIA	91	W	13637	BLUE CHERY PU	
9	008 - 115KU 59114 4-3 13775	Blue Setta Wagon	56EAR2IA	35		58985	WHITE SEEP	
10	009-115KU59114	Blue/Grey VW Van	P7446766	36	**	" "	BLACK PORCHE	
11	NIA-HEVILEGAIS	Grey Acura SUV	P6884895	37	35:2	13738	PORSCHE	WPOAVE
917	2 4-3 13793	Blue Tesla	P7241521	38	*02	13682	SW?	
13	3 012-115KU59035	Silver Mercedes SL 500 Unaffected-Garage	PSKTE457					
14	4 013-115KU57045	Grey Lexus 350 Un affected - Driveway	P6DFUI54					
۲	5 OFFIISKUS9050	Black Bentley Brabus Minor Mud	P7WJF365					
1	6 012- 112KU29021	White they suburban Unaffected	P48AA429					
	17 OIL-115KU5402L	White VW Bug Undfected	P- (donado 437 CDQ					
	18 017- 115KU59034	Silver Ford Flex Unaffected Plack Brilly 328	P-000000 578 HZN P-410TOZI	Н				
	19 018-115KU59034	Black BMW 328 Unaffected BMW BLACK SUV	6HOK778	Н				
	20 92 13789	SILVER HOUSE SUV		Н				_
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	24 mm 57151	MERCENES SILVER.	GTI K321					1
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Strengths:

- -BoO was relocated closer to the operational area.
- -Search teams used GPS, obtained vehicle make/models, license plate and vin numbers to track where vehicles came from.
- -Used gators and utilities to transport extrication equipment and personnel.







Strengths:

- -Search manager tracked all information and put another search report for Division Supervisor. All info was sent electronically to sit/stat using RTF-4 g-mail account.
- -Excavator was acquired.
- -Gulf and Charlie strike teams were used to continue large area search.
- -Structural Specialist assessed damaged structures.







Area for improvement/recommendations:

- -Search teams started covering areas that were already searched duplicating the information which confused the Search Manager.
- -Search teams should use colored flagging tape to tag vehicles so it's confirmed by other search teams that the vehicles have already been searched.







On January 16, 2018, Five RTF's had already been demobed from the incident.

RTF-4 had completed their mission and covered primary and secondary search of the entire "South Division" and took advantage of the time to start decon of personnel, equipment, and K9's.








RTF-4 ORG CHART





- 1. LESSIS/CAFFEY/OCONITRILLO/ZUNIGA/MELBORNE
- 2. GENOVESE/CLARIDGE/HARDYMENT/MEDINA/EDWARDS
- 3. TWITCHELL/HARVEY/MATSUMOTO/CATE/BUCCOLA/MITCHELL
- 4. BROWN/HERRERA/NOVELLA/FETNER/TERRY/IRWIN

HAZ-MAT SPECIALIST (2)

- 1. HARDYMENT
- 2. CLARIDGE

K9 SEARCH SPECIALIST (2)

1. **OES**

HEAVY EQUIPMENT RIGGING SPECIALIST (1) **IRWIN**

STRUCTURAL SPECIALIST (1) **MELBORNE**

ADVANCE TEAM PERSONNEL:

TFL OR ATFL (1)

SEARCH MGR (1)

RESCUE MGR (1)

TSS (2)

ASO (1)

ADVANCE TEAM APPARATUS:

UT63 (BoO, GATOR 1, GATOR 2)

BC3 OR U37 (TFL OR ATFL)





- -IMT was operating the incident with a brush fire mentality.
- -More heavy equipment was needed on the incident.
- -RTF's felt that a US&R Operations Chief was needed at the ICP.
- -RTF's didn't agree what was being called "secondary search".
- -Search/Victim/Building markings were wrong from the initial action companies resulting in RTF's to mark correctly. Spray painted homes not damaged.







Search Marking Stickers

When using a search sticker, it should be placed at the main entrance to the building. Search teams will use the information box to add additional information on coverage level and other critical information such as location of hazards and gaps in coverage.

If additional searches are performed on the same structure, search teams will place a new search sticker **next** to the original. They must lightly mark out the original search sticker. It is important not to erase or remove the search history of a structure.









- -RTF's came with large apparatus (footprints) and incident base was unable to support the parking.
- -Incident maps didn't correlate with what RTF's were seeing in their divisions.
- -When RTF's were relocated to different divisions, no intel was passed on to what was completed on the prior operational period causing RTF's to start from scratch.
- -Information/location of the last point seen of victims was never relayed to RTF's.
- -Soil sample results were never given to RTF's.





- -K9's were having issues searching in mud.
- -ROSS qualifications for US&R positions differ from CICCS (TFL vs US&R TFL)
- -DIVS didn't know how to utilize RTF's.
- -Incident Support Team (IST) was needed.
- -RTF's felt that they should've spiked out on the line because of the large footprint.



INCIDENT CHALLENGES



- -Pie crust pools covered with mud
- -Man hole covers missing covered with mud
- -Fecal/urine/body fluid contaminates
- -Natural gas leaks
- -Collapsed structures
- -4 to 8 feet of mud
- Deceased human/animals
- -Sharp objects (glass/metal/wood etc.)



INCIDENT CHALLENGES



- -Electrical/power lines down
- -Unstable trees (snags)
- -Large to extreme rocks
- -Unstable debris piles
- -Heavy equipment
- -Street/highway access blocked with debris



TASK FORCE LEADER



- Footprint very large, but can be managed if known area we will be working.
- RTF-4 were pre-deployed to MobEx— not realistic, with this deployment, not an issue.
- All US&R's should have UHF and VHF portable and mobile.
- Having equipment related to mud waders, rubber boots, disposable cover-all's.
- Deployment was receptive to flexibility within incident, but at times needed to re-establish objectives within operational needs and equipment limitations.



TASK FORCE LEADER



- RTF-4 needs to operate within the incident if set up i.e.: fuel, meals, supply.
- Base camp could not handle the foot print of all resources within base camp, off base housing resulted.
- RTF-4 used U-TAC as coms and incident communication plan wanted all RTF's on VHF. Area C units need to be reminded outside Area C, we cannot use our direct channels (Example Red 10).
- Advanced teams were discussed but not needed based on incident operational period.



TASK FORCE LEADER



- Travel- known to have access problems- should've given us instructions on how to access area through closed freeway/roads. TFL called OES and received information necessary to enter area. Should have come from incident base/dispatch.
- Having a base set up or forward BOO really makes a difference. Even better would be to leave resources in this area, if secure and not working 24 hour ops. Set up for next ops would be quicker and less work on the crews.
- On an incident like this or earthquake, each RTF should have a back hoe, dump truck and dozer assigned to them for quicker access to area search.



ASSISTANT TASK FORCE LEADER



- -Made team assignments at Del Valle.
- -Ensured that the operational objectives where being met.
- -Supervised Search Manager and ASO (No RM).
- -Acquired heavy equipment/K9's.
- -Food/Water/Logistics
- -ICS 213 and 214 for the team.
- -Law enforcement contact.
- -Communications with team.



ASSISTANT TASK FORCE LEADER



- Scouted for additional assignments throughout division.
- Team Welfare/Rehab
- Decon location
- Public Relations
- Turned in search reports to Division Supv/Sit Stat.
- Built relationships with other RTF's.
- PAS & GLN have to send TWO Captains.
- Kept the team motivated.



ASSISTANT SAFETY OFFICER



- Worked with Division Safety Officer.
- Scouted out safety hazards and made them known to team.
- Communicated with ATFL on safety hazard findings.
- Appropriate PPE for mud environment
- Accountability of team
- Decon Plan
- Poison oak (US&R22 personnel)



SEARCH MANAGER



- -Coordinated search activities
- -Used a scribe/logistics
- -Team cohesiveness
- -Attitudes
- -Willingness to work/adapting
- -Good Coms with Search Team Leaders
- Technical Search Specialist skills
 - Large area search
 - Gps
 - Mapping



TEAM LEADERS & PERSONNEL



- -Team was safely aggressive.
- ICS was used correctly.
- Uniformity (patches, helmets, t-shirts)
- TFL must have US&R TFL class.
- Zero communication from incident base on what roads were closed.
- Consider a modified advance team/recon to scout a location for BoO.
- BoO worked great.



TEAM LEADERS & PERSONNEL



- -ATFL had a thorough knowledge of how to utilize team.
- -Great having E701 bringing up the rear of footprint when traveling.
- -Lose the department patches on deployment as we are ONE team.
- Search teams were divided up perfectly.
- Gulf and Type 3 Strike Teams were very helpful.
- UTV's and 4x4 vehicles were a must!












































































































































































CA-RTF-4 MONTECITO







CA-RTF-4 FOOTPRINT







CA-RTF-4 DEMOB







CONCLUSION



- This was the first deployment for RTF-4 and the entire RTF system since the program was developed in 2005.
- Many lessons were learned from this incident (challenges/issues).
- RTF-4 and other RTF's worked great together.
- RTF-4 Deployment policy was put to the test and worked- 3 USAR calls in Area C while RTF-4 was deployed (US&R51 & US&R 71).
- RTF-4 deployment quarterly drills have paid off (training). 7 agencies truly working as ONE.
- RTF-4 logistics trailer is needed and in the works.



CONCLUSION



- Montecito can't receive more than .5 inches of rain.
- Staffing plan for next rain event for Montecito will be: 6 US&R RTF's, 2 SF/S&R, 4 Type 1 ST, 4 Type 3 ST, 8 Gulf ST, HEQ, and IMT.
- Ojai has been deemed for imminent mudslide/debris flow.
- RTF-4 must remain in a state of readiness.



RTF-4 EXECUTIVE BOARD



- PAS Batt Chief AC Brown- RTF-4 Program Manager
- PAS Captain Robert Sepulveda- RTF-4 Coordinator
- MPK Captain Richard Tullius- US&R Coordinator
- ARC Captain Joe Herrick- US&R Coordinator
- SGB Batt Chief Newton Ong- US&R Coordinator
- ALH Captain Mike Brown- US&R Coordinator
- GLN Engineer Dan Claridge- US&R Coordinator
- MRV Captain Chris Huson/Engineer Alex Arellano-US&R Coordinator



QUESTIONS?



